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Returning to New Orleans after Hurricane Katrina 
We examine the determinants of returning to New Orleans within 18 months of Hurricane 
Katrina.  Our theoretical framework predicts the probability of returning is positively associated 
with less hurricane damage and greater pre-hurricane levels of location-specific capital. We test 
these implications using data from a study of low-income parents—mainly African American 
women. We find that flood exposure is the most important factor in determining the decision to 
return. Among those who did not experience flooding, those who did not own homes or lived in 
the homes of relatives or friends were less likely to return. 
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Returning to New Orleans after Hurricane Katrina 
 
 
Hurricane Katrina displaced approximately 650,000 people and destroyed or severely damaged 
217,000 homes along the Gulf Coast. Damage was especially severe in New Orleans, and the 
return of displaced residents to this city has been slow. The fraction of households receiving mail 
(which, in the absence of reliable population estimates, is a good indicator for returns) was 49.5 
percent in August 2006, and 66.0 percent in June 2007 (Greater New Orleans Community Data 
Center, 2007). Low-income minority families appear to have been slower than others to return 
(William H. Frey and Audrey Singer, 2006). 
  In this paper, we examine the determinants of returning to New Orleans in the 18 months 
after the hurricane. The data come from a study of low-income parents—mainly African 
American women—who were enrolled in a community college intervention prior to the 
hurricane. Although the sample is not representative of the pre-Katrina population of the city, it 
nonetheless is of great interest. The relatively slow return of low income, primarily African 
American, residents is a politically charged issue. One (extreme) view is that the redevelopment 
plans are designed to discourage low-income minority residents from returning. A quite different 
view is that members of this group have found better opportunities outside of New Orleans, and 
do not want to return. Because few data sets trace individuals from before to after the hurricane, 
this debate has taken place largely without the benefit of evidence.  
 
I. Theoretical Framework 
We present a simple model of the return decision that is used to motivate the empirical work that 
follows. Individuals’ utility is assumed to be a function of their level of income, , and their 
stock of location-specific capital, C . Location-specific capital is defined as aspects of homes, 
communities, and networks of friends that are not easily replaced in other cities, at least in the 
yshort run. Note that location-specific capital does not include financial assets or easily-replaced 
personal property. Losses in these assets produced by the hurricane are sunk costs that should not 
affect the location decision. Location-specific capital (and losses of this type of capital) can, in 
contrast, affect the value of living in one location relative to another. 
  An individual who lives in New Orleans receives income   and has a location-specific 
capital level of C . If she were to leave New Orleans, she would receive an income of  and 
have a location-specific capital level of zero. Figure 1 depicts an indifference curve that traces 
the set of points at which an individual is just indifferent between staying in New Orleans and 
leaving. This indifference curve specifies a set of “break even” income levels for each value of 
, denoted as  . Given a value of  , an individual with  that exceeds   remains 
in New Orleans. If not, she leaves the city, moving to Point A with income equal to  and   
equal to zero. The figure emphasizes the idea that elements in C—such as networks of family and 
friends, and attachment to neighborhood communities—influence location decisions. For 
example, an individual at point   would receive a higher income outside of New Orleans, but 
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  Hurricane Katrina is modeled as having two effects. First, individuals experience losses to 
their location-specific capital based on the degree of destruction from the hurricane. Let λ  
denote the fraction of capital that is destroyed, so that the new value of location-specific capital 
is  0 1 ) 1 ( C C λ − =
For simplicity, we assum
.  Second, the hurricane disrupts employment, so that individuals receive a new 
draw from the distribution of earnings that prevails in the city after the hurricane.  Individuals 
receive this new draw because jobs are destroyed, wages within jobs change, or individuals who 
return have the opportunity to take jobs that are left vacant by those who have not returned. (In 
our sample, only 48 percent of those who return to New Orleans work for a former employer.) 
e that   is unaffected by the hurricane.  An individual returns if the 
A y
 2new draw on income in New Orleans offsets the destruction in location-specific capital produce
by the storm. In the example shown in the graph, the individual returns to New Orleans only if 
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everal comparative statics results are evident from the figure:  
eturn ation-
  S  (1) the probability of
r ing is decreasing in outside income
A y , conditional on the level of post-hurricane loc
specific capital; (2) the probability of retu ng decreases with the level of destruction of the 
location-specific capital (
rni
λ ), holding  0 C  fixed; and (3) the probability of returning increases 
with  0 C , holding λ fixed. There may also be interactions between λ and  0 C . For example, 
initial location-specific capital may have little effect on return decisions for those with very high 
 3values ofλ.  In the extreme, if λ is equal to 1, location-specific capital afte he hurricane wi
equal 0 and location decisions will be made solely on the basis of relative incomes. 
 
II. Empirical Analyses 
r t ll 
Sample m mbers were participants in an on-going study of low-income parents who had enrolled 







                                                
e
e ty of New Orleans in 200
randomized study was to examine how incentive-based scholarships influence academic 
achievement and wellbeing. Baseline information was collected for the 1,014 participants i
study. When Hurricane Katrina struck, 492 participants had completed a 12-month follow
survey, which collected information on participants’ economic status, social support and health.  
  After Hurricane Katrina, we attempted to re-interview these 492 participants via a 
telephone survey conducted between May 2006 and March 2007. We located and surveyed 402 
participants for a final response rate of 81.7%. We also geocoded the addresses at which th
lived at the time of the 12-month interview, and matched addresses to water depth data from 
September 2, 2005, the day on which standing water levels in the city are estimated to have 
peaked.
1 (We use self-reported water depths for the 15 respondents whose addresses were P.O
boxes.) Water depths indicate whether respondents lived in hard-hit areas. Our analyses are 
based on 355 participants, 96 percent of whom are women, who lived in the New Orleans MSA 
before the hurricane. Although the sample is small, it is unique as we have pre-Katrina data f
our sample (See Craig Landry et al (2007) for studies based on samples without baseline data.) 
Table 1 shows sample means and standard deviations (in parentheses), for the full sample
and for those who had and had not returned to the New Orleans MSA by the time of the follow-
 
1 These data are distributed by the LSU GIS Information Clearinghouse: CADGIS Research Lab, 






Variable  Full sample  Returned  Not returned 
ey.  (Only 8 sample members said they did not evacuate from their homes because of the 
hurricane; we do not have evacuation information for an additional 5.) All variables except wate
depth were measured prior to the hurricane. Those who had returned (49.6 percent of the sample)
were significantly less likely than others to be black, and more likely to have lived in the homes 
of friends or relatives or to have owned their own homes than to have been renters. There is a 
striking difference in the amount of flooding experienced between those who did and did not 
return: 23.9 percent of those who returned had positive levels of flooding four days after the 
hurricane struck, compared to 58.7 percent of those who did not return. 
 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
Race is black  0.733  0.905*  0.820 
Married  or  cohabiting  0.245 0.233 0.257 
nds or relatives  0








Owned Own Home  0.130  0.170  0.089* 
Lived in home of frie 0.146  0.199  .095* 
0.704 
Social support scale (z-score) 
0.000  
0.020 –0.020 
Indicator: Water depth>0   0.414  0.239  .587* 





Notes: The sample contains 355 observations, 
categories not show
of which 176 had retu
n include “white” (9.3 percent), (4.8 per d “not r  (3.9 
percent).   
Values for those who did and did not return are significantly different at the 5-percent level or 
rned and 179 had not. Race 
cent) an  “other”  eported”
*
better.  
 5We examine whether returns are positively associated with less hurricane damage and 
greater pre-hurricane levels of location-specific capital. Our primary measure of hurricane 
damage exposure (λ ) is an indicator of whether the water depth was positive. We use four 
measures of location-specific capital, all of which were measured prior to the hurricane. The first 
is an indicator for whether the respondent owned her own home, and the second is whether she 
lived with friends or relatives. If housing markets function perfectly, homeownership per se 
should not be a measure of location-specific capital. However, this seems unlikely to be the case. 
In addition, home owners may be more likely to be attached to neighborhoods than renters. 
Living with friends or relatives may also indicate that the respondent has social ties in New 
Orleans. The third measure is an indicator of whether the respondent attended church frequently, 
which indicates the presence of a social network in New Orleans. The last measure is an 8-item 
social support scale that contains items such as “There are people I know will help me if I need 
it,” (C.E. Cutrona and D. Russell, 1987). Each item is coded on a 4-point scale, summed, and 
then converted from the final scale to a within-sample z-score.  
  Table 2 shows the results of OLS regressions of an indicator for having returned to the 
New Orleans MSA on the variables of interest and demographic controls. Results for the full 
sample, shown in the first two columns, indicate that those who lived in flooded areas were 
between 30 and 40 percentage points less likely to return. Regressions (not shown) that include 
dummies indicating the respondents’ parish or (if the parish is Orleans) ward, yield similar 
results. We also found that the return decision is based more on whether there was flooding than 
on the amount of flooding: in a regression that included both the indicator that water depth was 
positive and the water depth in feet, the coefficient on the water depth was small and 
insignificant. This may arise because actual water depths were imprecisely measured, or because 
even small amounts of standing water produced serious damage to homes and neighborhoods.  
 6Table 2  
pth=0 
: Dependent variable: Indicator that individual returned to the New Orleans area
  Full sample  Water depth>0  Water de
Indicator: Water depth>0   –0.368***  –0.320***    
(0.051)  (0.052) 






(0.024)  (0.034)  (0.033
Race is black    –0.204**  0.047  –0.204** 








(0.025)  (0.037)  (0.034) 






Lived in home of friends/relatives   0.096  –0.064  0.206** 
Number of children    –0.045*  –0.077**  –0.010 
) 
(0.090)  (0.036)  (0.095) 
** 
Social support scale    –0.009  0.031  –0.055 
(0.072)  (0.132)  (0.087) 
Notes: Regressions include a male dummy, the number of months between the hurricane and 
interview, indicators that race is “other” or “missing,” and (for co
***Significant at the 1-percent level; **the 5-percent level; *the 10-perce
the 
lumn 3) water depth. 






Respondents with more children were less likely to return, possibly because schools w
slow to reopen. African Americans were also less likely to return, even controlling for water
depth. (Note that African Americans were more likely than others to have experienced flooding:
45.0 percent of blacks had positive flooding, relative to 25.0 percent of others.) Relative to 
renters, homeowners were nearly 18 percentage points more likely to return, and those living 
with relatives or friends were 9.6 percentage points more likely to return. However, the 
coefficients on “attended church frequently” and the social support scale are negative 
statistically significant.  Nevertheless, the location-specific capital variables are jointly 
significant at the 3 percent level. 
 7Our theoretical framework implies that there may be interactions between the amount of 
damage (λ) and the location-specific capital variables. We examine this by estimating separate 
id and did n , shown i the last two columns. 
Consisten  with the framework, the lo ecifi measures do not predict returns 
among those who experienced flooding (i.e. those w values
regressions for those who d  not experie ce flooding n 
t cation-sp c capital 
ith high   ofλ). Furthermore
e who did not experi nce flooding (i.e. those with low values of
, return 
decisions among thos e λ) are 
sensitive to several demographic characteristics and location-specific capital measures, although 
me
icantly more likely to return than Howev ent church attendees 
were 17.3 percentage points less likely than others to return. It may espondent
yed by the hurricane ven if t s were not, making it less attractive 
 be tha responde  ties to   found it 
develop social networks in new cities. This latter interpretation suggests that church involvem




not always in the ways expected. As expected, ho
friends were signif
owners and those who lived with relatives or 
 renters.  er, frequ
 be that r s’ 
churches were destro , e heir home
to stay in New Orleans. It may also t  nts with churches easier to 
ent 
represents “portable” rather than location-specific capital.  
ely to return. To examine whether this is the case, we used data from the 2000 Census to 
construct a measure of 
A y equal to average weekly earnings of low-skilled workers in the 
locations in which individuals had lived just prior to returning to New Orleans or, for those who 
had not returned, in their locations at the time of the survey. We estimated models that inclu
this measure, as well as the individual’s monthly earnings in New Orleans prior to the hurricane 
to proxy for earnings potential in New Orleans. The coefficients on both variables were s
and insignificant. However, it is possible that these variables are very inaccurate measures of 
economic opportunities in New Orleans and elsewhere.  
 8III. Discussion 
The results shown above indicate that flood exposure is the single most important factor in 
determining the decision to return. Yet, 36 percent of those who experienced no flooding had n
returned to the New Orleans area by the time of the follow-up survey. Among those who did 
experience flooding, those who did not own homes or lived in the hom s of relatives or friends
were less likely to return. Those who attended church frequently were, somewhat surprisingly
also less likely to return.  
  The framework developed above implies that the losses from the hurricane should be 
largest among those who experienced more hurricane damage. However, some evacuees may 
have been unaware, prior to the hurricane, that better economic and social opportunities w
available in other locations. If so, the forced movement out of the city due to the hurricane could 
have resulted in welfare improvements.  
  We do not find evidence to support this idea. We divided individuals into four groups, 










puted mean changes in monthly earnings from before to after the hurricane for each 
group. Those who experienced flooding and did not return had reductions in earnings that were 
on average $192 larger  n members of the other three groups.  (Earnings changes for members 
of the other three groups were not significantly different from each other.)  Although we do not 
know what members of this group would have earned had they returned to New Orleans, it is not
the case that their financial circumstances improved after Hurricane Katrina. 
 9 10
 to 
Stress.  In W.H. Jones & D. Perlman (Eds.), Advances in Personal Relationships
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